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The economic environment and the current health care debate have prompted a critical reevaluation of previous and
current physician-hospital integration models. Even though the independent, self-employed, private practice, medical
staff remains the most common model, surgical specialists such as vascular surgeons are increasingly being employed and
integrated into health care delivery systems. The degree of integration varies from minimal to full integration or full
employment. This review defines the forces driving these changes and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each
employment model from the physicians’ point of view. Strategies for the successful implementation of a 21st century
integrative employment model are discussed. (J Vasc Surg 2010;51:1046-53.)One of themost tenuous and capricious relationships in
health care is that between physicians and hospitals. It is a
symbiotic relationship based on necessity. Hospitals cannot
function without physicians, but not all physicians need to
work at a hospital. Those physicians that utilize hospitals
have choices about the type of affiliation they want with the
hospital or health care system. Physician practice models
range from the self-employed practitioner to the full-time
hospital employee, with an array of employment models in
between.
The economic environment and the national health
care debate have only accelerated the reevaluation of the
wide assortment of practice models for primary care physi-
cians (PCPs) and specialists. A perceptible recent shift has
occurred in the number of hospitals employing physicians.
During the past 4 or 5 years, Merritt Hawkins reports an
almost 300% jump in the number of hospital searches for
physicians with a corresponding increase in searches by
specialists for salaried jobs.1
This article will consider the forces that are driving
integration of physicians and hospitals and the current state
of affairs with particular emphasis on the effect on vascular
surgeons. We will discuss the basis of various models of
physician employment, both past and present. Finally, from
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1046a physician perspective, we lay out objectives of any inte-
gration and factors important for success. To be sure, most
physicians are still practicing independently, although
many have enough interaction with hospitals and health
care systems that this discussion will be relevant to them.
INTEGRATION AND ALIGNMENT
Many have described the practice of medicine as the
prototypical cottage industry, with each practice an inde-
pendent unit. Before discussing hospital-physician integra-
tion, we need to look at the way physician practices have
changed. The Center for Studying Health System Change
(CSHSC) reported that the number of solo or two-surgeon
practices declined from 47.8% in 1996 to 1997 to 37.5% in
2004 to 2005 (P .01).2 The theme of employment rather
than ownership was also confirmed by declined from 61.6%
to 54.4% in the proportion of physicians with an ownership
stake in their practice.
In contrast to PCPs, the survey reported more move-
ment of surgical specialists to alternative settings such as
hospital-owned centers and academic institutions, presum-
ably because of a downward spiral in reimbursement and
operational efficiencies and in an attempt at achieving econ-
omies of scale. Because private practice groups have difficulty
meeting the demands of new graduates, deep-pocketed hos-
pitals are better positioned to make offers or assist their
loyal physician groups with hiring. Indeed, Merritt
Hawkins Associates reports that 45% of their physician
search assignments in 2008 and 2009 were for hospitals, up
from 23% in 2005 and 2006.3
Why integration? “Markers of integration include
strong physician-hospital links, coordinated systems of
care, geographic reach, quality management, contractual
capabilities, utilization controls, financial strength, orga-
nized oversight and economy of scale.”4 The more markers
leasing
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physician perspective, benefits may include “cost-effective
administration, improved access to other providers and
support systems, access to a broader range of support
services, financial strength and security, increased customer
satisfaction, access to educational resources, ownership po-
tential, increased market share, increased access to data and
information systems, group purchasing discounts, strategic
planning, and enhanced image in the community”4 (Table I).
From a health care system point of view, integration is
difficult, time consuming, and expensive, prompting the
question: Why do hospitals want integration? Physicians
tend to think it is all about control, but the reasons are
complex andmany. First, is the prospect of a piece-by-piece
loss of profitable revenue streams such as to freestanding
ambulatory surgery, endoscopy, and imaging centers. Out-
patient surgical volumes have grown at an annual com-
pounded growth rate of 6%, whereas hospital outpatient
growth is flat.1
Vascular surgeons are a particular worry for hospitals.
The chronic disease market is vital for long-term growth of
Table I. Pros and cons of physician-hospital integration m
Model Pro
Independent medical staff (no
integration)
1. Physician keeps ind
autonomy
2. Hospitals compete
admissions
Partnership (minimal to medium
integration)a
1. May get access to n
increased revenue
2. No loyalty guarant
3. Access to hospital e
services
4. Retain some indepe
True joint venture (medium
integration)
1. Provides access to h
access to technical
2. Learning vehicle fo
cles
3. New markets may b
Clinic model (full integration) 1. Clinical leaders gov
enterprise, role in g
2. Physicians own ent
practice infrastructu
3. Could transition to
4. Income from ancill
5. Work-life balance m
Foundation model (full integration) 1. Could transition to
2. Income from ancill
3. Access to managem
coordinated strateg
4. Work-life balance m
Full employment (hospital-based group
practice; total integration)
1. Free from most offi
stresses
2. Stable income, low
3. Work-life balance m
4. Generally has physi
5. Access to capital an
expertise
6. Edge in recruiting
aIncludes physician-hospital organizations, managed service organizations,hospital margins. The prime reasons for hospitals employ-ing cardiovascular specialists are securing volumes, incen-
tivizing them to meet quality and cost goals, prevent them
from partnering with competitors, and to minimize the
impact of anti-kickback and Stark laws.1 The average hos-
pital net revenue per full-time employee physician is $1.5
million for all specialists and $2 million for vascular
surgeons.1,5
Second, in an era of increasing competition, the hospi-
tal is responding to pressures from payers, consumer orga-
nizations, and the government to have a seamless, contin-
uous, quality-conscious system and is therefore looking for
increasing efficiencies: operational, clinical, and strategic as
well as advantages in innovation and expansion of itsmission.6
Then, hospitals look to the future and see a shortage of
surgeons. Population and workload analysis suggests a
shortage of between 330 and 399 vascular surgeons by
2030 if no changes are made in the current training para-
digm.7 Hospitals have many reasons not to get back into
the employer role like they did in the 1980s and early
1990s. Although they no longer pay for goodwill, practice
acquisition costs, including salaries and benefits, are con-
ls (from physician viewpoint)
Cons
dence and
ferrals and
1. No compensation support from hospital
2. Little input into hospital policy and opera-
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3. Hospital may hire and employ physicians to
compete
atients and
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ce
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shifts
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e better
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3. Shared decision making
4. Physicians responsible for management
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e better
1. ‘System’ owns subsidiary
2. Integration (fit) may not be ideal
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ility costs
e better
eadership
nagement
1. Little independence, loss of efficiency
2. Lifespan entirely dependent on hospital
3. Compensation negotiations stressful
4. If not employed through subsidiary, income
from ancillaries may be at risk
, gainsharing, medical directors, part-time employment, etc.ode
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d masiderable. Some practices have not kept up with techno-
JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY
April 20101048 Satiani and Vaccarologic advances, and capital has to be invested into making
their offices and electronic medical records compatible with
the health care system. However, as mentioned, the hospi-
tals also understand the significant revenues generated by
surgical specialties.
Physician barriers to integration. The benefit of
hospital employment is primarily driven by economics.
Reimbursements are trending downward, overhead ex-
penses keep rising, practices are unable to compete with
deep-pocket hospitals for new recruits, and the regulatory
environment seems to become more complex. Coupled
with insufficient capital for major technologic upgrades and
an increasing lack of interest in running the business, phy-
sicians are looking for security of income. Younger physi-
cians want to work fewer hours for predictable compensa-
tion.
There is also unhappiness over the inefficiencies and
unresponsiveness of hospitals, however. Press Ganey sur-
veyed 27,000 physicians at 300 hospitals in 2007 and
reported some valuable perspectives.8 The number one
issue for physicians was how the administration responded
to their ideas, needs, and concerns. Surgeons were the least
satisfied of all specialties: on a scale of 0 to 100, with
vascular surgeons scoring 67.5, compared with 70.5 for all
other surgeons, 73 for other medical specialists, and 75.2
for employed physicians. Older surgeons who are used to
their clinical and operational autonomy will be resistant to
being answerable to a hospital administrator. Also, other
Fig. Stages of integration. HMO, Health maintenance
private-care physician; PHO, physician-hospital organizat
Company.than the physician enterprise model to be discussed later,because employment contracts are most often year to year,
if hospitals decide to let physicians go, they have to start all
over again, with their patients now belonging to the hos-
pital and being restricted by legal covenants.
INTEGRATION MODELS
The models to be discussed all share some degree of
integration ranging from low or minimal to full or total
integration (Fig).
Minimal integration
The mainstay of the physician-hospital relationship for
decades has been the voluntary or independent medical
staff model, which involves no integration of the physicians
and hospitals. In this model, the hospitals provide technol-
ogy and support that affords the physician an opportunity
to perform procedures and other services that they could
not otherwise provide through their own offices or clinics.
In return, as part of the medical staff compact, the physi-
cians develop loyalty to “their” hospital by voluntarily
serving on hospital committees, providing on-call coverage
to the emergency department, referring their patients to
the facility for care, and teaching at hospitals with training
programs.
Physicians maintain their autonomy and independence,
and the hospitals must essentially compete for referrals and
admissions. Such independence, however, comes at a cost.
This model does not allow any direct financial support from
anization; MSO, managed service organizations; PCP,
VS, vascular surgeon. Adapted fromThe Advisory Boardorg
ions;the hospital at a time when physician income has not kept
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into the operation of the hospital and policy decisions. The
hospital may decide to hire its own physicians and set them
in direct competition with the voluntary staff, especially if
there are conflicts between administration and the physi-
cians. The hospitals hope that the reputation of their phy-
sicians is of such magnitude in the community to drive
other referrals to their facility.9,10
From a hospital perspective, this model may have the
unfortunate result of creating an oversupply or undersupply
of some specialties, which affects referral patterns and hos-
pital revenue but has no effect on the physicians. Further-
more, this model does not incentivize physicians in assisting
the hospital in achieving key operational targets related to
costs, quality, efficiencies, and patient satisfaction.9 Hospi-
tals must continually develop programs and policies to
engender physician loyalty to their hospitals, and inadver-
tent adversarial behavioral practices can slowly erode phy-
sician support, impel the independent physician to auton-
omous outpatient centers or ambulatory surgery centers
(ASCs), or result in migration to other facilities. In addi-
tion, independent physicians are increasingly resentful that
reimbursement for the technical portion of a service to the
facility for the patients that they refer far exceeds the
professional reimbursement to the physician. Although this
paradigm is waning, it remains the primary model being
practiced.9
Part-time medical directors. This is one of the most
common arrangements, in which a usually independent
physician agrees to provide part-time administrative ser-
vices to a section such as the vascular laboratory for a set fee.
The fee may be negotiated based on national surveys pub-
lished by the Medical Group Management Association. A
step further is when a physician or group of physicians
agrees tomanage a department or section of the hospital for
a fee. A rural hospital, for example, may arrange to com-
pensate an independent vascular surgeon a fixed amount to
interpret noninvasive images and then collect global fees.
The reverse, when a physician group engages the hospital
to do the same, such a professional billing, is less common.
Transition to medium integration
In the 1990s the medical landscape was significantly
affected by the advent of capitation and managed care.10 In
his book The Social Transformation of American Medicine,
Paul Starr suggests that it was Richard Nixon who gave
impetus to managed care with the passage of the Health
Maintenance Organization Act of 1973, making health
maintenance organizations (HMO) the first form of man-
aged care.11,12
Capitation is a method of fixed payment to a physician
or hospital per plan enrollee for specified care. Managed
care was intended to reduce the costs of medical care while
improving the quality of care delivered.13 Although physi-
cians and hospitals in this country were widely exposed to
these new concepts, lasting penetration was variable, with
California, Oregon, and Minnesota being regions where
managed care thrived.14Groups of PCPs contracted to manage the risk of these
new managed care contracts were designated gatekeepers.
Anticipating that the managed care model of capitation
with PCPs as the gatekeepers would become the dominant
model for health care, the hospitals began to purchase
primary care practices and hire the physicians, at great
expense, as a primary strategy to procure an adequate
number of covered lives.10 Unfortunately, even though
multiple managed care models were developed, few sur-
vived due to several reasons:
First, there was a common perception that the for-profit
companies that developed many of the managed care
plans were more interested in profits than providing
quality health care.
Second, many consumer advocacy groups contended that
patients were being denied medical care for the sake of
limiting costs, and new standards for managed care
were enacted that drove the costs even higher.13
Althoughmanaged care products remain plentiful, cap-
itation as the preferredmodel of reimbursement has waned.
Specialists, in particular, began to again embrace fee-for-
service payment,12 and hospitals began to divest themselves
of their employed primary care practices in an attempt to
minimize further financial losses.10
There are many physician practice models with this
level of integration. The physician gains access to new
patients, generates more revenue, and has access to hospital
expertise and support services while retaining some degree
of independence. These models may not be as profitable as
other models that will be discussed later, and there usually
are no compensation guarantees.
Physician-hospital organization. The physician-
hospital organization (PHO) arose for the purpose of
jointly contracting with managed care organizations. Al-
though no revenue is generated or assets are owned, the
PHO is a conduit for the distribution of funds from man-
aged care products to the physicians and hospitals.9 Costs
are shared in this partnership, and administrative, manage-
ment, and marketing resources are provided.9 There has
been a slow but steady decrease in this practice model since
1999 due to high startup costs, legal complexities, and failure
to achieve increased physician reimbursement.9 A newer form
of PHO has arisen based on pay-for-performance incentives
for the delivery of quality care.15 Physician reimbursement
is tied to key quality indicators of care, and these improve-
ments in quality may lead to increased contracts with other
payers.
The managed service organization. The managed
service organization (MSO) is another form of integration
that is owned by the hospital but provides practice manage-
ment services to the physicians. The MSO provides access
to accounting, billing, coding, legal advice, collections, and
payroll resources.1 The physicians are still afforded their
independence and control of their medical practices. The
anticipated cost reduction through economy of scale was
not realized because practice costs continued to rise due to
higher billing and coding compliance standards and added
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MSO has also fallen into disfavor.
However, a revenue-oriented MSO has more recently
been developed to improve revenue through pricing, vol-
ume, and service mixture at the same time containing other
costs. This model has led to an increase in physician align-
ment with some health systems, resulting in a substantial
increase in patient market share. When integrated delivery
systems were first formed, practice acquisition, PHOs, and
MSOswere common vehicles, but they did little to enhance
a lasting relationship. In summary, these vehicles failed to
fulfill their potential because the main driver was to create a
structure rather than to develop objectives or the desired
outcome of integration.16
Independent contractor relationships. Independent
contractor relationships involve an agreement between
hospitals and physicians or groups where the latter provide
services on behalf of the hospital.
Leasing arrangements. A number of leasing arrange-
ments between physicians and hospitals have been devel-
oped to improve the relationship and at the same time
provide an enhancement of the physician’s income. Space,
equipment, and personnel are usually involved in the leas-
ing arrangement. When physicians lease these assets from
the hospital, the hospital benefits by having a fixed lease
income. The physician must maintain the space or equip-
ment and also does the billing. In return, the physician now
receives the technical share of the reimbursement, which
can lead to a considerable increase in income.1
Hospitals may also lease from the physicians as in an
ancillary lease in which the hospital leases ancillary equip-
ment from a physician-owned leasing company. This avoids
the need for the hospital to actually buy the expensive
equipment. The physicians can still get the technical fee,
but such relationships are drawing increasing scrutiny from
government regulators. To try to negate this risk, hospitals
are encouraging physicians to agree to the lease payment
for use of the equipment only, allowing the hospital to keep
the technical fee.
Joint venture models. Equity joint ventures allow for
increased integration between physicians and hospitals
whereby the parties enter into a financial partnership, usu-
ally by forming a limited liability corporation. The joint
venture is not limited in scope and may range from an
outpatient imaging or dialysis access center to an entire
hospital. The physicians share equally in costs, revenue, and
governance. “Of all the models, equity joint ventures offer
physicians the greatest autonomy, but they can create con-
flict between hospital and physician groups or potentially
lead to a domino effect where all procedural specialists want
their own similar ventures.”17
Physicians have a substantial capital contribution at the
onset, and if the venture fails, all investment could be lost.
Because a joint venture is a legal entity, there are high
startup and legal costs. Stark and anti-kickback laws must
not be violated. Other types of joint ventures include
leasing arrangements, purchased services agreements, con-
tracting outpatient services for clinical comanagement ser-vices, and gainsharing. Physician interest in joint ventures
has faded recently due to reducedMedicare reimbursement
in ASCs primarily due to hospital lobbying efforts, volume
losses from economic hardship, and significant pressure on
reimbursement for imaging technologies.
Gainsharing. In the gainsharing model, physicians
and hospitals target cost reductions by providing physicians
with financial incentives to reduce costs. “Under gainshar-
ing agreements, physicians and hospital administrators craft
product usage protocols with the aim of reducing costs
while maintaining high clinical quality. The cost savings are
shared between physicians and hospitals based on a prede-
termined formula.”1 Because they feared that physicians
would forego quality care by using cheaper, substandard
products, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) deter-
mined that such arrangements were illegal. Newer gain-
sharingmodels have since been developed following several
more OIG Advisory Opinions in 2005 and 2007, as long as
they maintain quality care and patient satisfaction.18,19
Significant investment in information systems is required
along with added legal and consulting expenses.
Participating bond transactions. In lieu of the usual
tax exempt bonds, these higher-interest bonds are issued to
finance joint ventures, but they are not sold to the general
public and have no public market and therefore carry more
risk. In addition, specialists like vascular surgeons may seek
higher returns in outpatient centers or ASCs where they do
not share revenues with hospitals.
High integration models
Clinic or foundation model. The clinic or founda-
tion model provides an opportunity for physicians and
hospitals to be fully integrated. The Cleveland and Mayo
Clinics best represent this model. The physicians are em-
ployed by a foundation, which is a not-for-profit, wholly
owned subsidiary of the health system. The physicians
remain in a separate corporate entity that provides them all
of their compensation through a professional service agree-
ment. The start-up costs to the health system are quite
substantial as they procure practices, including both tangi-
ble and intangible assets, and hire new graduates. Once in
place, however, physician retention is extremely high due
to income security and job satisfaction.
The foundation model significantly eases the severe
legal restrictions between the hospital and the physician
regarding the transfer of income. Physician compensation is
maintained at or abovemarket standards, thereby attracting
the best practitioners. The initial establishment of the tax-
exempt status is very costly and time-consuming. Compen-
sation may be based on a fixed fee or a percentage of
collections but is at the discretion of the physicians. Fur-
thermore, this model allows the best integrated systems to
control costs and provide the best pricing to payers through
consistent alignment of the physicians and health care
system in rewarding financially the delivery of cost-efficient
care. Importantly, the physicians have equal representation
in the governance of the entity, and in most cases, the chief
executive officer is a physician. The physician groups main-
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income allotted to them as a unit, rather than being at the
mercy of the health care system. All contracting with payers
is surrendered to the health care system. The health system
is also free to infuse capital as necessary to enhance practice
success.
The staff model. The staff model, which also allows
the opportunity for full integration, is best represented by
Kaiser Permanente, the largest nonprofit health care system
in the United States. There is full vertical integration of all
components in this health caremodel, including physicians,
administrators, nurses, physician-extenders, and other
health care providers. Kaiser is unique among health care
models because it is both a provider and a payer. It consists
of three distinct entities. The payer, Kaiser Foundation
Health Plans, contracts exclusively with the Permanente
Medical Groups and the Kaiser Foundation Hospitals,
which are the physician and hospital providers, respectively.
Rather than the system purchasing practices, the hospital
forms a physician enterprise that employs physicians full
time as partners and compensates them for both clinical and
administrative functions.
Unlike the foundation model, physicians have little
control over compensation. All physicians receive a straight
salary that is competitive in the market place and deter-
mined by the health care system. The physicians still make
all decisions regarding clinical care. The system is free to
infuse capital as necessary to develop and support practices
as well as physician compensation. The health care system
undertakes all administrative duties, freeing the physicians
of that burden, and the physicians are provided stable work
hours and call schedules. Protocols of care are derived from
evidence-based medicine that drive the system to uniform,
high-quality, cost-effective care across the system. Younger
physicians who put a higher premium on quality of life are
increasingly attracted to the staff model.
The advantage over other models is the degree of
leadership and the physician-centric environment that al-
lows physicians to retain ownership of their practices, have
a better work-life balance, retain their patients, employees
and records, as well as the freedom to return to their private
practices at the end of their employment, if they wish.20
This allows the physicians to continue as owners and main-
tain incentives for production. To avoid anti-kickback
problems, safe harbor contracts and appropriate fair market
values are put in place.
LEGAL CHALLENGES TO INTEGRATION
Stark law. This statute specifically applies only to phy-
sicians and prohibits them or their immediate families from
referring patients for certain designated health services to
entities with which they have ownership or compensation
relationships, unless these actions fall under specific excep-
tions.21 Almost every facet of any relationship between
physicians and hospitals has to be examined to see if it fits
under one of these exceptions.
Anti-kickback statutes. This criminal statute makes it
illegal for anyone to pay or receive anything of value inexchange for inducing referrals under the Medicare or
Medicaid program. The law allows some common and
necessary interaction to occur under safe harbors.22
Inurement issues. Almost all academic hospitals and
60% of community hospitals are not-for-profit tax-exempt
hospitals.23 Their tax-exempt status is in jeopardy, for
example, if any benefits accrue to a private rather than a
public interest. Therefore, any physician-related transac-
tions have to be at arm’s length and tied to fair market
value. The Internal Revenue Service considers it a private
inurement issue if an insider, such as a physician on the
board, benefits from a transaction.
DISCUSSION
Studies about the causes of stress and burnout among
surgeons have elicited varied responses, but generally in-
clude “lack of autonomy, difficulty balancing personal and
professional life, excessive administrative tasks, and high
patient volume.”24 It has generally been reported that loss
of autonomy is one of the important factors that leads
surgeons to contemplate retiring or changing occupations.
Perceived control over the practice environment was the
single most important factor in a study of 608 Kaiser
Permanente physicians.25 Why then would physicians give
up the thing they prize the most to work for a health care
system or hospital?
Although patient relationships (50%), intellectual stim-
ulation (40.7%), and professional and collegial relationships
(18%) are the three most satisfying parts of medical prac-
tice, reimbursement issues (54.2%), insurance hassles
(51.6%), and malpractice and defensive medicine issues are
increasingly forcing solo and small-group physicians to
reconsider giving up their autonomy for security, piece of
mind, and better work-life balance.26 Two-thirds of the
membership of the Society for Vascular Surgery consists of
private practitioners with or without teaching affiliations.27
Although some of the members may be employed by
hospitals, a large number of vascular surgeons in private
practice like the independence, knowing that their success is
directly related to their own hard work and not having to
answer to a series of administrators or an academic hierarchy.
When a physician does consider employment with a
health care system, there is no one-size-fits-all perfect
model. It depends on current entrenched interest groups,
past history of trust between parties, size of the physician
group, location, health system resources and board com-
mitment, practice and referral patterns, and the economic
climate in the community (Table II). The current eco-
nomic climate does present opportunities for financially
strong systems to purchase physician businesses that are
under reimbursement pressures.
One area that does not lend itself well to physicians
sharing governance with hospitals is the state-owned, aca-
demic medical center. Even though physicians are posi-
tioned as chairs, deans, or senior administrators, the rank
and file faculty may not perceive them to be representing
their interests. These physicians often wear too many hats
that inexorably tie them to administrative agendas. Only
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cian faculty demanding an equal voice in governance will
lead to newer models of integration.
What is sometimes not evident to some leaders in
health systems is that developing a model with the aid of a
few employed physicians and then selling it to the rest of the
physicians is a prescription for failure. No successful long-
term relationship can proceed in this scenario, even if it
saves time.
The key to successful integration for a health care
system is to first define objectives andmake sure that they fit
the corporate strategy as well as meeting the needs of the
physician or the group. This then defines the relationship
and makes it easier to measure performance against set
goals and objectives. The physicians, for example, may
indicate several important objectives such as lifestyle issues,
maintenance of income, top-quality patient service, effort-
less and easy use of facilities, and patient records or access to
the best technology. A common mistake is to have pro-
longed discussions about the exact structure or what the
new system will look like. Next, integration strategies
should be laid out consistent with the objectives. Function
over form should be emphasized.16 Discussions about gov-
ernance, which is often the most contentious issue, should
follow.
Surgical specialties are generally the least satisfied with
hospital operations compared with other specialties in
terms of patient care, ease of practice, and relations with
hospital leaders.8 Therefore, sharing governance is a very
important goal of any integration effort. Token represen-
tation on a board or governing body or placement of
known partisans is easily spotted.
It is also important to realize that no strategy will
eliminate all differences between the two parties but to
come upwith ways to leverage the differences. Finally, none
of this is easy, and setting artificial deadlines is a mistake.
Table II. Strategic factors to be considered by hospitals an
Factors Hospit
Supply/demand Specialist shortages forecaste
Economical viability Maintain referral base, disco
losses by incentive-based c
Regulatory complexities, practice
management
Changing anti-kickback/Sta
employment
Ancillary and outpatient revenues Employment avoids loss of r
competition from physicia
Quality of care, work-life balance With emphasis on quality-ba
employed physicians share
Reimbursement, need for capital Need completely aligned ph
performance and bundled
programs
Volumes Allows locking in existing an
ASC, Ambulatory surgery center.Instead, the parties should work on the differences andallow time to resolve the differences that truly are obstacles
to achieving the objectives.
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